The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. In each country, the labor market is either unionized or non-unionized. We show that, if all countries are non-unionized, the global free trade network is both the unique pairwise stable network and the unique e¢ cient network. If all countries are unionized, the global free trade network is pairwise stable and the unique e¢ cient network among the class of symmetric networks. If some countries are unionized while others are non-unionized, other networks apart from the global free trade network are likely to be pairwise stable. However, the e¢ cient network is likely to be the global free trade network. Thus, a con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously pro…table deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.
Introduction
The institutional structure of labor markets is frequently cited as an important determinant of international competitiveness. Although there is some related literature on the relationship between unions and international trade policy aspects, 1 none of it however deals speci…cally with unions and formation of free trade agreements. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how institutional features such as unionization will a¤ect the formation of free trade agreements among countries. By doing so, we try to rationalize the commonly made assumption that some countries are high cost while others are low cost.
While the presence of unions is not the only possible type of cost asymmetry between countries, wage di¤erences between European and foreign …rms and union bargaining strength appear to be empirically relevant for industries involved in EU antidumping cases. 2 Also, labor advocates in the United States argue that developing countries may have an "unfair" competitive advantage because their lower labor standards are the basis for their lower costs, which in turn are re ‡ected in lower prices for goods that compete with those produced in developed countries. In this paper, we show that high labor costs and strong labor unions which characterize some European and US industries could prevent the formation of free trade agreements between these unionized countries and countries with lower labor costs and weaker labor unions.
Since labor is not very mobile, the e¤ects of international integration on labor markets are mostly indirect via product market integration. In the literature, product market integration has been interpreted as a reduction in costs associated with international trade: transport costs, tari¤s, taxes, information costs about foreign markets, etc. These costs could be divided into …xed costs or start up costs associated with exporting, and variable costs proportional to the level of exports. Huizinga (1993) showed that a decrease in …xed costs, that implies the move from autarky to fully integrated markets, will increase the degree of competition in the product market and will reduce wages. However, Naylor (1998) showed that a decrease in variable export costs may give rise to a higher wage since a monopoly union responds by increasing the wage rate to the increased employment's demand. But these works proceed by considering only symmetric countries.
In this paper we address the following questions: To answer these questions we develop a three-stage game. In stage one, each government decides the bilateral free trade agreements (links) it likes to sign in order to maximize welfare. The collection of pairwise links between countries de…nes a trading regime (network). In the second stage, given a con…guration of free trade agreements, wages are set inside each country either by the union (if the …rm is unionized) or by the …rm (if the …rm is non-unionized). Finally, in the third stage, …rms compete in the di¤erent markets by choosing quantities. Each …rm regards each country as a separate market and chooses the pro…t-maximizing quantity for each market separately, and on the Cournot assumption that the other …rms'outputs in each market are given. We are interested in the network of free trade agreements that emerges in this setting.
We adopt the notion of pairwise stability of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in order to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run. A network is pairwise stable if no agent bene…ts from severing one of their links and no other two agents bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly. 3 We show that the global free trade network (or complete network), i.e., one in which each pair of countries has a bilateral free trade agreement, is a stable outcome if countries are either all unionized or all non-unionized. However, other network architectures are stable if some countries are unionized while other are non-unionized.
Thus, it seems that harmonization of labor markets may promote free trade. Indeed, in the last years, it is increasingly common for U.S. trade agreements to include provisions that support the harmonization of labor standards 4 in order to get a robust consensus in the U.S. and in the foreign country in favor of the agreement. Moreover, we …nd that, in case all countries are non-unionized, the complete network is the e¢ cient network (i.e. the 3 Strategic models of network formation were …rst developed by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) . Jackson (2003 Jackson ( , 2005 provided surveys of models of network formation. 4 Although in the past, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the U.S. agents are adding and deleting links based on the improvement the resulting network o¤ers relative to the current network. We also show that, in case all countries are unionized, the complete network is the unique e¢ cient network among the class of symmetric networks,
i.e., networks in which all countries maintain the same number of free trade agreements.
Thus, it seems that there is no con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency when either all …rms are unionized or all …rms are non-unionized.
In the …rst part of the paper we restrict attention to symmetric frameworks in which all countries are either all unionized or all non-unionized. We next examine two asymmetric frameworks in which there are both unionized and non-unionized countries. A general analysis of asymmetric frameworks however turns out to be very complicated; we therefore work with two examples of three countries (a …rst one with one unionized and two nonunionized countries, and a second one with one non-unionized and two unionized countries) and completely characterized the solution. In this setting there are four possible network architectures: the complete network, the star network, the partially connected network, and the empty network. 5 We …nd that, when only one country is unionized, the complete network is always pairwise stable, but the partially connected network in which the two non-unionized countries have signed a free trade agreement is also pairwise stable, except for very small values of the cost per unit of the commodity exported (when the initial degree of product market integration is very high). When only one country is non-unionized, the partially connected network in which the two unionized countries have signed a free trade agreement is pairwise stable for small values of the cost per unit of the commodity exported, the star networks in which one of the unionized countries is connected with the other two countries is pairwise stable for intermediates values of the cost per unit of the commodity exported, and the complete network is only pairwise stable for relatively high values of the cost per unit of the commodity exported. However, the complete network is the e¢ cient network in each of these two asymmetric settings. Thus, a con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency may occur. Moreover, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously pro…table deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.
Regarding the relationship between the degree of product market integration (measured as the level of variable export costs) and the wage level we …nd that, in presence 5 The star is a network in which there is a central country which is linked to every other country, while none of the other countries have a link with each other. The partially connected network refers to a con…guration in which two countries are linked while the third country is isolated.
of asymmetries among countries, it is no longer true that an increase in product market integration due to a decrease in variable export costs will increase wages as in Naylor (1998) . Depending on the strategic position of the domestic country in the network of free trade agreements, the increase in market integration would increase or reduce the demand for labor. Consequently, the monopoly union will respond by increasing or reducing the wage rate to the increased or reduced demand for labor.
Our paper is related to papers that study the incentives of countries to form regional free trade associations and customs unions, and the strategic stability of particular trading regimes. 6 Yi (1996) endogenized the formation of the customs union structure, which is a partition of the set of countries. He showed that the rules of customs union formation are
crucial: if open membership is allowed, then the grand coalition (global free trade) is the only stable customs union. However, the grand coalition is not stable under the rule that a union is formed if and only if all potential members agree to its formation. 7 The works of Goyal and Joshi (2006) They showed that, when all countries are symmetric, the global free trade network in which every pair of countries sign a free trade agreement is stable, and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. However, if countries are asymmetric in the market size and/or in the size of industrial good sector, the global free trade network may not be attained. 8 The purpose of the present paper is to show that the asymmetry consisting of having unionized and non-unionized countries, could also impede the formation of the global free trade network. We also discuss the con ‡ict 6 Levy (1997), Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005a) showed in their political economy models that preferential arrangements can hinder multilateral trade liberalization. Krugman (1991) , Ethier (1998) , and Bagwell and Staiger (1999) focused on the welfare e¤ects of preferential free trade associations and customs unions. 7 Kennan and Riezman (1990) , and Bond and Syropoulos (1996) studied the strategic stability of particular trading regimes. Grafe and Mauleon (2000) studied the consequences of a private externality on the formation of free tade agreements in a general equilibrium framework. 8 
The model
We develop a three-stage game in a setting with n countries, each of which has one …rm producing some homogeneous good that can be sold in the domestic market and in each foreign market. A …rm's ability to sell in foreign markets, however, depends on the level as given the output decisions of the other …rms, the settled wages and the network structure of free trade agreements. We are interested in the network of free trade agreements that emerges in this setting.
We denote by N = f1; 2; :::; ng the set of countries which are connected in a network of free trade agreements. We assume that n 3. Let N (g) = fi 2 N : ij 2 gg be the set of countries that are involved in some free trade agreement in the network g. Let N i (g) = fj 2 N : ij 2 gg denote the set of countries with whom i has a free trade agreement in the network g. We de…ne i 2 N i (g). Let n i (g) denote the cardinality of N i (g). A network is said to be symmetric if every country has the same number of free trade agreements. In a symmetric network n i (g) = n j (g) = k for any two countries i and j. The number k will be referred to as the degree of network g. 9 We will denote a symmetric network of degree k by g k , k = 0; 1; :::; n 1. Notice that symmetric networks allow for non-exclusive relationships. For example, in a four-country model, a symmetric network of degree 2 involves a country having links with countries which are not linked to each other.
We assume that product demand is linear:
where P i is the price of the homogeneous good in country i and X ji is production by …rm j for consumption in country i. Production technology exhibits constant returns to scale with labor as the sole input and is normalized in such a way that
, where L i is labor input of …rm i and P j2N X ij = X i is the total production of …rm i. The total labor cost to …rm i of producing quantity X i is W i X i , where W i is the wage in …rm i. Let I ij be such that I ij = 1 if countries i and j have not negotiated a free trade agreement, and I ij = 0 if countries i and j have negotiated a free trade agreement. Then, for any network g, …rm i's pro…ts can be written as
where T is the constant unit trade cost. We restrict parameter T to be 0 T a n+1 . By doing so, we concentrate on the more interesting cases in which there is positive trade between two countries that have not negotiated a free trade agreement in at least one of the network architectures. When the …rm is unionized, a risk-neutral union chooses the wage that maximizes the economic rent,
where W is the reservation wage. 10 Without loss of generality, we assume W = 0. In case the …rm is non-unionized, the …rm chooses the wage that maximizes pro…ts, i.e., W i = W = 0. For any network g, the social welfare of country i is given by
where 2 , is the consumer surplus of country i, i (g) is the pro…t of …rm i located in country i, CT i (g) = P j6 =i I ij T X ji is the tari¤ revenue of country i, and U i (g) are the rents of union i. Let SW (g) denote aggregate welfare in network g. Then, aggregate social welfare is given by
1 0 By tractability, we do not consider a version of the right-to-manage model where unions and …rms have bargaining power over wages. However, Jones (1989) and Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2005) showed that, if the union bargaining power is not too big, it is optimal for unions that maximize the rents to send to the negotiating table delegates who maximize the wage, and such negotiations may mimic the monopoly-union outcomes where the unions choose their most preferred wages.
Before looking for the stability and e¢ ciency of networks of free trade agreements, we analyze the relationship between the degree of product market integration (measured as the level of variable export costs) and the wage level in a three-country model. We …nd that, in presence of asymmetries among …rms, an increase in product market integration due to a decrease in variable export costs does not necessarily increase wages as in Naylor (1998). An increase in market integration will increase or reduce the demand for labor depending on the strategic position of the home country in the network of free trade agreements. Consequently, the monopoly union will respond by increasing or reducing the wage rate to the increased or reduced demand for labor. The impact of an increase in market integration on wages in unionized countries is summarized in Table 1 where the symbol "+" means that the impact is positive and that wages increase as a result of higher degrees of market integration, and the symbol " " means that the impact is negative and that wages decrease as a result of higher degrees of market integration.
empty network partial network star network linked isolated spoke hub all countries unionized + + + + only one country non-unionized + + + only one country unionized + nil Table 1 : The impact of an increase in market integration on wages in unionized countries
For instance, in case all countries are unionized, an increase in product market integration will increase wages in the empty and partially connected networks. In the star network, an increase in product market integration will increase wages of the …rms in the spoke countries and will reduce the wage of the …rm in the hub country. 11 Indeed, the increase in product market integration makes the …rm in the hub country su¤ering from the increased competition of the …rms in the spoke countries. As a consequence, the exports from the hub country to the spoke countries decrease. The monopoly union will respond then to the reduced demand for labor by reducing the wage rate. Thus, we observe that there is no monotonic relationship between the degree of product market integration and the wage rate. While in the empty network greater market integration increases wages, in the partially connected and star networks greater market integration has an ambiguous impact on wages that depend on the strategic position of the domestic country into the network of free trade agreements and on the degree of product market integration. 1 1 Of course, the wage levels do not depend on the degree of product market integration in the complete network.
Stability and e¢ ciency of free trade networks
A simple way to analyze the networks that one might expect to emerge in the long run is to examine a sort of equilibrium requirement that agents not bene…t from altering the structure of the network. A weak version of such condition is the pairwise stability notion de…ned by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) . A network is pairwise stable if no agent bene…ts from severing one of their links and no other two agents bene…t from adding a link between them, with one bene…ting strictly and the other at least weakly.
and
This de…nition of stability is quite weak and should be seen as a necessary condition for strategic stability. 12 
Two symmetric frameworks
We …rst study pairwise stable networks when countries are either all unionized or all non-unionized. The welfare expressions can be found in the appendix. Proof. Condition (ii) in the de…nition of stability is trivially satis…ed since no further agreements are possible.
Assume …rst the case in which all countries are non-unionized. Since n 3, we have that
and the condition (i) of stability is satis…ed. Assume next the case in which all countries are unionized. Since n 3 and T a n+1 , the stability of the complete network is obtained from the fact that
is always positive. Proof. We have that
. Thus, every pair of non-linked countries has incentives to sign a free trade agreement. Since the network g was arbitrary, the proof follows.
Proposition 2 tells us that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network in case all countries are non-unionized. Also, the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network in case of three unionized countries. However, a similar comparison between SW i (g) and SW i (g + ij) cannot be done in general with n unionized countries. Remark 1. The complete network is pairwise stable in case of n symmetric countries that optimally adjust their tari¤s rates to changes in the free trade networks.
Indeed, if a country deletes a link with another country from the complete network, these symmetric countries would impose the same optimal tari¤ rate to each other. So, we can also conclude that the result of Proposition 1 holds in case each country optimally adjusts its tari¤s rate to a change in the free trade network. However, it could be that, in that case, the complete network is not the unique pairwise stable network when all countries are non-unionized. 13 Suppose now that the government maximizes a more general social welfare function with arbitrary weights on consumer surplus, producer surplus, tari¤ revenues and union's rents in the welfare function. In the polar case in which non-unionized countries care only about domestic consumer surplus then bilateral trade agreements would also generate a global free trade regime because the consumer surplus is increasing with the number of active …rms in the country. In the other polar case in which countries maximize domestic pro…ts, the global free trade regime is the unique pairwise stable network in case all countries are non-unionized. Indeed, one can show that i (g + ij) > i (g) for any g. This suggests that, in case of non-unionized …rms, …rms will have no incentives to lobby against bilateral trade agreements. This result contrasts with Goyal and Joshi (2006) where tari¤s are prohibitively high between countries that do not have a bilateral free trade agreement.
Indeed, given that …rm's pro…t under autarky are higher than in any symmetric trading regime in which every country has a given number of active …rms, Goyal and Joshi (2006) concluded that other networks apart from the complete network could be stable. In our model, the fact that tari¤s are not prohibitive between countries that have not signed a free trade agreement makes non-unionized …rms also preferring the free trade regime. So, there is no con ‡ict between …rms'objectives and social welfare maximizing countries: both countries and …rms support the free trade regime in case all countries are non-unionized.
We now examine aggregate social welfare under the di¤erent networks. Remember that aggregate social welfare SW (g) under a network g is given by SW (g) = P i2N SW i (g). We say that a network g is e¢ cient if and only if SW (g) SW (g 0 ) for all g 0 . Proposition 3. The complete network g c is the unique e¢ cient network in case all countries are non-unionized.
Proof. In order to prove that the aggregate social welfare under the complete network SW (g c ) is higher than the aggregate social welfare under any other network g, we compute
And this expression is always positive since n i (g) < N for at least two di¤erent countries.
Proposition 3 shows that, when all …rms are non-unionized, there is no con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency. The complete network g c is both the unique pairwise stable and e¢ cient network. When all …rms are unionized, we show below that the complete network g c is the unique e¢ cient network among the class of symmetric network structures, i.e., networks in which all countries maintain the same number of free trade agreements. Among the non-symmetric networks, we can also show that the complete network g c is more
e¢ cient than g c ij.
A general proof among the non-symmetric network has not been obtained. However, it can be shown that, in a model with only three unionized countries, the complete network is also the unique e¢ cient network.
Proposition 4. Assume all countries are unionized. The complete network g c is the unique e¢ cient network among the class of symmetric networks. Moreover, the complete network is more e¢ cient than the network g c ij.
Proof. In a symmetric network all countries have the same social welfare; hence, SW (g) = P i2N SW i (g) = n SW i (g). So, in order to prove that the complete network is the unique e¢ cient network among the class of symmetric networks we have to compare SW i (g c ) with
for any k = 1; :::; n 1. We have
for any k = 1; :::; n 1 since T a n+1 . Moreover, among the asymmetric networks, we can also show that SW (g c ) > SW (g c ij). Notice that
= aT (12n 5 + 30n 4 + 12n 3 8n 2 4) n(n + 1) 4 (2n + 1) T 2 (4n 6 + 6n 5 14n 4 13n 3 + 32n 2 + 33n + 6) n(n + 1) 4 (2n + 1) , and this expression is always positive because T a n+1 .
Finally, we explore which pairwise stable networks are likely to be reached from a situation in which no country has signed a free trade agreement (in fact the empty network). Such networks are called stable states. We …rst de…ne the notions of improving paths and stable states due to Jackson and Watts (2001, 2002 ). An improving path from a network g to a network g 0 is a …nite sequence of networks g 1 ; :::; g K with g 1 = g and g K = g 0 such that for any k 2 f1; :::; K 1g either: (i) g k+1 = g k ij for some ij such that
and SW j (g k +ij) SW j (g k ). An improving path is thus a sequence of networks that might be observed in a dynamic process where agents are adding and deleting links based on the improvement the resulting network o¤ers relative to the current network. 14 This corollary follows from the proof of Proposition 2, where we have shown that
for any arbitrary network g. Hence, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, sequences of networks due to continuously pro…table deviations will always lead to the complete network. Remember that the complete network g c is also the e¢ cient one. In case of three unionized countries, the complete network g c is also the unique stable state. However, a general proof for n unionized countries has not been obtained.
Two asymmetric frameworks
To analyze the networks of free trade agreements that unionized and non-unionized countries are going to form, we now consider a world with three countries. 15 In particular,
we are going to examine two di¤erent situations: an asymmetric setting with only one unionized country and two non-unionized countries, and another asymmetric setting with two unionized countries and one non-unionized country. The welfare expressions can be found in the appendix.
We …rst consider countries'incentives to form bilateral free trade agreements. Lemma 1 tells us that any pair of symmetric countries (with respect to the network position and the unionization level) has always incentives to negotiate a free trade agreement.
Lemma 1. Any pair of symmetric countries has always incentives to form a bilateral free trade agreement.
The proof of Lemma 1 and all the proofs in this subsection are available from the authors upon request. There are two e¤ects when two symmetric countries sign a free trade agreement implying a tari¤-free access to their respective markets. First, the foreign …rm can enter the domestic market without paying tari¤s. It has an ambiguous impact 1 4 Each network in the sequence di¤ers by one link from the previous one. If a link is added, then the two agents involved must both agree to its addition, with at least one of the two strictly bene…ting from the addition of the link. If a link is deleted, then it must be that at least one of the two agents involved in the link strictly bene…ts from its deletion. 1 5 This oligopolistic perspective has been recently adopted by Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005a) , and is also consistent with recent empirical evidence that shows that trading blocs that are small in world markets can a¤ect outsiders signi…cantly (see Chang and Winters, 2002) .
on the social welfare of the home country since it increases domestic competition and thus increases consumers surplus but lowers pro…ts of the domestic …rm from domestic operations and collected tari¤s. Second, the domestic …rm gets greater access to the foreign market. It raises pro…ts of the domestic …rm from foreign operations. However, the net impact on the social welfare of the home country is positive. So, any pair of symmetric countries has an incentive to form a bilateral free trade agreement.
Lemma 2 tells us that any pair of countries, one unionized and one non-unionized but having a similar position in the network, has not always incentives to negotiate a free trade agreement. Moreover, these incentives are smaller the bigger the number of unionized countries and the smaller the number of free trade agreements already signed.
Indeed, when a country signs a free trade agreement, the domestic …rm gains greater access to the foreign market and su¤ers in the domestic market because of increased competition.
The negative e¤ect of increased competition is shared by the domestic …rm with the other active foreign …rms in the home market and, thus, it is smaller the greater the number of free trade agreements (the active …rms) the home country has already signed. Under unionization, a large share of the pro…ts of the domestic …rm goes to the union which diminishes its competitive advantage with respect to the non-unionized foreign …rm.
Hence, the positive impact on social welfare of the home country due to greater access to the foreign market can be relatively small compared to the large decrease on pro…ts of the domestic …rm in the domestic market in case the number of active …rms in the home country is small enough. Thus, the net impact on the social welfare of the home country of a bilateral free trade agreement can be negative. This prevents sometimes the unionized country from forming a bilateral free trade agreement with a non-unionized country.
We now analyze which networks are pairwise stable when one country is unionized and two countries are non-unionized. 16 We now analyze which networks are pairwise stable when the …rms of countries i and j are unionized and the …rm of country k is non-unionized. Proposition 6. Suppose countries i and j are unionized and country k is non-unionized. The fact that the partially connected network g p (ij) is pairwise stable only for high enough degrees of product market integration can be explained as follows. Since the pro…ts of the unionized hub …rm are increasing with T , the lower the degree of product market integration the greater the incentives of any unionized linked country to form a link with the isolated non-unionized country. Then, for small enough degrees of product market integration the star network g s (i) or g s (j) will be formed. Any of these two star networks is pairwise stable for T 0 < T 63a 275 . Smaller degrees of product market integration give incentives to the spoke unionized country to form a link with the spoke non-unionized country moving to the complete network. Contrary to the previous cases, the complete network is pairwise stable only for small enough degrees of product market integration, 63a 275 < T a 4 . Indeed, for such values of T , the …rm of the spoke unionized country prefers not to sell the good in the spoke non-unionized country. The formation of a bilateral free trade agreement between both countries results then advantageous for both of them.
Notice that the complete network "survives" (in the sense that it remains pairwise stable for some values of the external tari¤s) the introduction of asymmetries in countries (unionized or non-unionized), and this could be seen as something positive for multilateral trade liberalization. However, the conclusion that follows from the previous analysis is that harmonization of labor markets may promote free trade, in the sense that the complete network is always pairwise stable whatever the number of countries.
We now examine aggregate social welfare under the di¤erent networks.
Proposition 7. In any of the two asymmetric settings, the complete network g c is the unique e¢ cient network and aggregate social welfare is increasing with the number of links.
Proposition 7 shows that, when only one country is unionized, a con ‡ict between pairwise stability and e¢ ciency may occur (see Figure 2) . Meanwhile the e¢ cient network is always pairwise stable, the reverse is not true since the partially connected network g p (ij) is sometimes pairwise stable but is never e¢ cient. When only one country is nonunionized, a con ‡ict between pairwise stability and e¢ ciency occurs (see Figure 3) . Indeed, for T 63a 275 , the e¢ cient network is never pairwise stable and vice versa. Only for 63a 275 < T a 4 , the complete network g c is both the unique pairwise stable network and the e¢ cient network. Finally, we want to mention the fact that, once countries are of di¤erent types, a con ‡ict between e¢ ciency and stable states is likely to occur. We observe that, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, sequences of networks due to continuously pro…table deviations will not lead in most cases to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is e¢ cient and pairwise stable. Thus, the con ‡ict between stable states and e¢ cient ones is far from being negligible when there are countries of di¤erent types.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have examined the formation of free trade agreements as a network formation game. We have considered a n-country model in which international trade occurs between economies with imperfectly competitive product markets. In each country, the labor market is either unionized or non-unionized. We have shown that, if all countries are non-unionized, the global free trade network is the unique pairwise stable and e¢ cient network and the unique stable state that results from a dynamic process starting from the empty network. If all countries are unionized, the global free trade network is pairwise stable and the unique e¢ cient network among the class of symmetric networks. Thus, it seems that there is no con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency when either all …rms are unionized or all …rms are non-unionized. But if some countries are unionized while others are non-unionized, other networks apart from the global free trade network are likely to be pairwise stable. However, the e¢ cient network is always the global free trade network. Thus, a con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency may occur when some countries are unionized and others non-unionized. So, the harmonization of labor markets may promote free trade, in the sense that the complete network is always pairwise stable. In addition, starting from the network in which no country has signed a free trade agreement, all sequences of networks due to continuously pro…table deviations do not lead (in most cases) to the global free trade network, even when global free trade is stable.
The scope of the three-country analysis presented here for the two asymmetric frameworks is limited in that it does not include such possibilities as, for instance, the formation of two free trade agreements between two unionized and two non-unionized countries, respectively, where further liberalization implies a symmetric elimination of preferential access in both bilateral arrangements. However, we think that our results are general enough and that, in case of n-countries of di¤erent type, the con ‡ict between stability and e¢ ciency will persist. But the particular trading regime that would be stable in such case is an open question. Also, the generalization taking into consideration a di¤erent demand function and a di¤erent technology are left for further research.
In this paper, we have assumed that a trade treaty is costless. However, in practice, a free trade agreement is the result of long protracted negotiations between countries and it could be costly. What would be the e¤ect of introducing a cost of link formation?
Obviously, the answer depends on the relative importance of the link cost compared to the bene…ts of forming such link. Our intuition is that the cost of negotiating a free trade agreement is small compared to the bene…ts the countries could derive. Hence, although the introduction of such costs could destabilize the complete network, our results would still hold for small enough link costs.
We have also assumed that countries can form or delete one link at a time. Clearly, the negotiations to form a new free trade agreement take place one by one. But why not to allow a country to delete several links at a time? Indeed, the consideration of such possibility here would not alter the results of the paper.
Some extensions may be worthwhile. First, it would be interesting to treat the trade regime, as well as the choice of external tari¤s under each trade regime, as endogenous decisions. We have concentrated on the incentives for liberalization on a non-discriminatory basis by assuming that uniform non-discriminatory tari¤s are applied by all countries on imports from other countries. We have also considered that external tari¤s remain constant with the formation of a free trade agreement. These assumptions are necessary to simplify the model for analyzing various forms of complicated free trade networks in the presence of unionized and non-unionized countries. Since the World Trade Organization precludes members of free trade areas from using these arrangements as a justi…cation to bypass their previous tari¤ bindings and raise external tari¤s, one could allow for the possibility that external tari¤s decrease with the formation of a free trade agreement. Nevertheless, in the case of symmetric countries (either all unionized or all non-unionized), the complete network continues to be stable even in the case in which each country optimally adjusts its tari¤s rate to a change in the free trade network. Second, it would be interesting to consider other objective functions for the countries. Krishna (1998) showed that multilateral liberalization that is initially politically feasible could be rendered infeasible by a preferential arrangement when the external tari¤s to non-members are …xed and countries maximize domestic …rms'pro…ts. Ornelas (2005b) extended Krishna's framework by endogenizing external tari¤s to non-members and assuming that governments maximize a welfare function that assigns a higher weight to pro…ts. But these two papers treat as given the trading regimes. Thus, it would be very interesting to study the robustness of Krishna (1998) and Ornelas (2005b) results when trading regimes are endogenized.
The aggregate social welfare in any network g is given by
B All countries are unionized
The social welfare of country i in any network g is given by
where
C One unionized country, two non-unionized countries
The empty network.
For the unionized country:
For a non-unionized country:
and the global welfare is SW (g e ) =
17(3a 2T )(93a+34T ) 3456b
The partially connected network.
Suppose the isolated country is non-unionized. For a linked unionized country:
For a linked non-unionized country:
For the isolated non-unionized country:
and the global welfare is
When the isolated country is unionized, we should distinguish two cases.
For the isolated unionized country:
. Then, X ij (g p ) = X ik (g p ) = 0, i 6 = j, i 6 = k, when i denotes the unionized spoke country.
W j (g p ) = a + 2T 6 ; SW i (g p ) = (331a 298T )(a + 2T ) 1152b
and the global welfare is SW (g p ) = (33a 14T )(47a + 14T ) 1152b
The star network.
Suppose the hub country is unionized. For the unionized hub country:
For a non-unionized spoke country:
and the global welfare is:
When the hub country is non-unionized, we should distinguish two cases.
[Case 1] T 3a 16
For the unionized spoke country:
; SW i (g s ) = 3735a 2 120aT 1688T 2 10368b
For the non-unionized hub country:
For the non-unionized spoke country:
and the global welfare is SW (g s ) = 4743a 2 420aT 172T 2 3456b
[Case 2] 3a 16 < T a 4 . Then, X ik (g s (j)) = 0, i 6 = k, when i denotes the unionized country. For the unionized spoke country:
For the non-unionized spoke player:
The complete network.
For the non-unionized country:
and the global welfare is SW (g c ) = 527a 2 384b D Two unionized countries, one non-unionized country
W i (g e ) = 3a 2T 15 ; SW i (g e ) = (3a 2T )(177a + 122T ) 1440b
SW i (g e ) = (1389a 206T )(3a 2T ) 7200b
and the global welfare is SW (g e ) = 13(3a 2T )(81a + 26T ) 2400b
Suppose the isolated country is unionized. For the linked unionized country:
For the linked non-unionized country:
Suppose the isolated country is non-unionized. For the linked unionized country:
Suppose the hub country is non-unionized. We distinguish two cases.
[Case 1] T 9a 41
and the global welfare is SW (g s ) = 3159a 2 252aT 86T 2 2400b
[Case 2] For the unionized spoke country:
Suppose the hub player is unionized. We distinguish two cases.
[Case 1] T 63a 275
For the unionized hub country:
; SW i (g s ) = 1239a 2 + 504aT + 260T 2 3360b
; SW i (g s ) = 1239a 2 + 126aT 475T 2 3360b
and the global welfare is SW (g s ) = 1053a 2 140aT 50T 2 800b
[Case 2] 63a 275 < T a 4 . Then, X ik (g s (j)) = 0, i 6 = k, when i denotes the unionized spoke country.
; SW i (g s ) = 287341a 2 + 55766aT + 47407T 2 749088b
and the global welfare is SW (g c ) = 1053a 2 800b :
